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Abstract  
Big data streaming has become an important paradigm for real-time processing of massive continuous data flows 
in large scale sensor networks. While dealing with big sensing data streams in sensor networks, a Data Stream 
Manager (DSM) must always verify the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the data to ensure end-to-
end security as the medium of communication is untrusted, and malicious attackers could access and modify the 
data. Existing technologies for data security verification are not suitable for data streaming applications, as the 
verification in real time introduces a delay in the data stream. In this paper, we propose a Dynamic Prime Number 
Based Security Verification (DPBSV) 1 scheme for big data streams. Our scheme is based on a common shared 
key that is updated dynamically by generating synchronized prime numbers. The common shared key updates at 
both ends, i.e., source sensors and DSM, without further communication after handshaking. Theoretical analyses 
and experimental results of our DPBSV scheme show that it can significantly improve the efficiency of 
verification process by reducing the time and utilizing a smaller buffer size in DSM. We have experimented the 
proposed scheme in a simulated environment and demonstrated the feasibility of the approach.  We observed that 
the proposed scheme not only reduces the verification time or buffer size in DSM, but also strengthens the security 
of the data by constantly changing the shared keys.  
Keywords—Security; Sensor Networks; Big Data Stream; Key Exchange; Security Verification. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Big Data Stream 
A large number of applications, such as  large scale sensors, information monitoring, web exploring, data from 
social networks like Twitter and Facebook, surveillance data analysis,  and financial data analysis, deal with a large 
stream of data input, and consequently require an alternate ideal model of real-time data processing. As a result, a 
new computing paradigm based on Stream Processing Engines (SPEs) has appeared [15]. SPEs deal with the 
specific types of challenges and are intended to process data streams with a minimal delay [15-18]. In SPEs, data 
streams are processed in real time (i.e. on-the-fly) rather than batch processing after storing the data.  
                                                          
1The preliminary version of this paper is published in 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in 
Computing and communications (IEEE TrustCom-15) Helsinki, Finland. 2015. [47] 
Several of these applications are approaching the bottleneck of current data streaming infrastructures and require 
real-time processing of very high-volume and high-velocity data streams (also known as big data streams).  The 
complexity of big data is defined through V4’s: 1) volume – referring to terabytes, petabytes, or even exabytes 
(10006 bytes) of stored data, 2) variety – referring to unstructured, semi-structured and structured data from different 
sources like social media (Twitter, Facebook etc.), sensors, surveillance, image or video, medical records etc., 3) 
velocity – referring to the high speed at which the data is handled in/out for stream processing, and 4) veracity – 
referring to the quality of data. These features introduce huge open doors and enormous difficulties for big data 
stream computing. A big data stream is continuous in nature and it is important to perform real-time analysis as the 
lifetime of the data is often very short (data is accessed only once) [22, 25]. As the volume and velocity of the data 
is so high, there is not enough space to store and process; hence, the traditional batch computing model is not 
suitable.  
1.2 Data Stream Security Verification 
 Even though big data stream processing has become an important research topic in the current era, the data 
stream security has received little attention from researchers [43, 44]. Some of these data streams are analyzed and 
used in very critical applications (e.g. surveillance data, military application, Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA), etc.), where data streams need to be secured in order to detect malicious activities. The 
problem is exacerbated when thousands to millions of small sensors in self-organizing wireless networks become 
the sources of the data stream. How can we provide the security for big data streams? In addition, compared to 
conventional store-and-process, these sensors will have limited processing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy. 
Furthermore, data streams ought to be processed on-the-fly in a prescribed sequence. In this paper, we address these 
issues by designing an efficient architecture for real-time processing of big sensing data streams, and the 
corresponding security scheme.  
The common approach to security is to apply a cryptographic model. Keeping data encrypted is the most 
common and safe choice to secure data in transmission, if the encryption keys are managed properly. There are two 
most common types of cryptographic encryption methods: asymmetric and symmetric. Asymmetric-key encryption 
algorithms (e.g. RSA, ElGamal, DSS, YAK, Rabin, etc.) perform a number of exponential operations over a large 
finite field. Therefore, they are 1000 times slower than symmetric key cryptography [7, 8]. Efficiency becomes an 
issue if asymmetric-key based infrastructure such as the Public-Key Infrastructure PKI [28, 29] is applied to big 
data streams. Thus, symmetric-key encryption is the most efficient cryptographic solution for such applications. 
However, symmetric-key algorithms (e.g. DES, AES, IDEA, RC4) fail to meet the requirements of real-time big 
data streams security processing due to the properties of big data (i.e., 4Vs). Hence, there is a need for an efficient 
scheme for securing big data streams.  
1.3 Motivation  
 The discussion above led to four most important features of the big data stream from the point of view of 
security verification:  
1. Security verification needs to be performed in near real time (on-the-fly). 
2. Verification framework has to deal with high volume and high velocity data. 
3. Data items can be read once in the prescribed sequence.  
4. Unlike the store-and-process paradigm, original data is not available for comparisons in the context of the 
stream processing paradigm. 
In light of the above features and properties of big data streams, we classified existing security solutions into 
two classes: Communication Security [9, 19, 48, 49] and Server side data security [26, 27, 30, 36]. Communication 
security deals with data security when it is in motion and server side security deals with data security when it is at 
rest. The security threats and solutions proposed in the literature are further discussed in the related works section. 
Those proposed solutions are suitable for store-and-process, however are not plausible for big data streams.   
Another major motivation is to perform the security verification on near real time in-order to synchronize with 
the processing speed of SPEs [43]. Stream data analysis performance should not degrade because of security 
processing time, there are several applications needs to perform data analysis on real time. According to the features 
of big data stream (i.e. 4Vs) existing security solution needs huge buffer size to process security verification. Which 
is simple impossible to maintain such big buffer for data stream because of the continuous nature of data. Therefore, 
light wait security mechanism is very much important to perform security verification on near real time and reduce 
buffer size.  
1.4 Research Challenges  
As discussed earlier in this section, symmetric cryptographic solution is the best way to protect data in faster 
processing time. Existing symmetric cryptographic based security solutions for data security are either static shared 
key or centralized dynamic key. In static shared key, we need to have a long key to defend from a potential attacker. 
Length of the key is always proportional to the security verification time. From the required features of big data 
streams specified in last subsection, it is clear that security verification should be in real-time. For the dynamic key, 
centralizing processor rekeying and distributing keys to all the sources is a time consuming process. A big data 
stream is always continuous in nature and huge in size. This makes it impossible to halt data for rekeying, 
distribution to the sources and synchronization with DSM.  
Buffer size for the security verification is another major issue because of the volume and velocity of the big 
data stream. According to the features of big data stream (i.e. 4Vs), we cannot halt the data for more time before 
performing the security verification. This leads to an allocation of bigger buffer size in SPEs and may reduce the 
performance of SPEs. Hence, the buffer size reduction is one of the major challenges for big data stream.  
1.5 Our contributions 
In order to address the challenges, we have designed and developed a Dynamic Prime-Number Based Security 
Verification (DPBSV) scheme. Our scheme takes in to account a typical shared key that is updated dynamically by 
producing synchronize prime numbers. The synchronize prime number generation at both source sensing device 
and DSM enables reduction of the communication overhead without compromising security. Due to the reduced 
communication overhead, our scheme is suitable for big data streams as it verifies the security on-the-fly (near real 
time) and reduce the buffer usage.  Our proposed scheme uses a smaller key length (64-bit). This enables faster 
security processing at DSM without compromising the security. The same level of security is accomplished by 
changing the key progressively in a specific interval of time. Dynamic key generation is based on the random prime 
numbers, which are initialized and synchronized at source sensors and DSM without further communications 
between them after handshaking. This increases the efficiency of the solution. Based on the shared key properties, 
individual source sensors updates their dynamic key independently. Due to the reduced key length, our scheme is 
suitable for processing high volumes of data without any delay. This makes DPBSV highly efficient at DSM for 
processing secured big data streams. 
In summary, we are proposing a scheme for big data stream security verification without the need of key 
exchange for rekeying. The additional benefit of this is that it reduces the communication overhead and increases 
the efficiency of the security verification process at DSM. Our proposed scheme is efficient in comparison to AES, 
as it reduces the computational load and execution time significantly compared to the original AES; furthermore, 
it also strengthens the security of the data, which is the main research contribution of this paper. The contributions 
of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
 We present a secure big data stream processing architecture.  
 We design and develop an efficient Dynamic Prime-Number Based Security Verification (DPBSV) scheme 
for big data streams. 
 We evaluate our proposed DPBSV scheme in our architecture and show that our solution is efficient when 
applied to big data streams in comparison to AES standard.   
1.6 Organization of the Paper 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: related work is reviewed in the next section; Section 3 provides 
the background on big sensing data stream and corresponding security related work; Section 4 describes our 
DPBSV key exchange scheme; Section 5 presents the security analysis of our scheme formally; Section 6 
evaluates the performance and efficiency of our scheme through experimental results and Section 7 concludes our 
work and suggests future work. 
 
 
Figure 1. A simplified view of a DSMS to process and analyze input data stream [15]. 
 
2. Related Works 
This section describes the related works in the area under two broad categories:  stream data processing and 
data security.  
2.1. Stream Data Processing 
Data streaming has become an important paradigm for the real-time processing of continuous data flows in 
several domains such as finance, telecommunications, large scale sensor networks which require online processing 
and security verification of continuous data flows. A large amount of data is collected by such applications; for 
example, Tien [24] measured about 4 zettabytes (or 10**21 bytes) of digital data being generated per year by 
everything from underground physics experiments to retail transactions to security cameras to global positioning 
systems.  
Stonebraker et al. [20] outlined eight requirements that a system software should meet to excel at a variety of 
real-time stream processing applications: Keep the Data Moving, Query using SQL on Streams (StreamSQL), 
Handle Stream Imperfections (Delayed, Missing and Out-of-Order Data), Generate Predictable Outcomes, 
Integrate Stored and Streaming Data, Guarantee Data Safety and Availability, Partition and Scale Applications 
Automatically, and Process and Respond Instantaneously. For our purpose, we have classified some important 
paradigm of stream data processing in Table 1. We use the application areas, processing techniques, proposed 
technique and QoS as our classification properties.  We next describe some of these architecture in brief. 
Table 1: Stream processing classifications of some exiting technology 
Architecture  Focused data stream  Proposed Technique Processing  
Technique 
QoS 
StreamCloud 
[12, 14] 
Deals with big data Parallel Query 
processing 
Parallel Scalable and elastic 
with input load 
Staying FIT 
[13] 
Distributed sensor 
network 
Load Shedding Centralize and 
Distributed  
-Effect of query 
load distribution 
-Effect of input 
dimensionality 
STREAM [15] Any                   
 
Query execution 
resource utilization 
Centralized  Multiple continuous 
queries over 
multiple continuous 
data streams 
Monitoring 
Streams [16] 
Sensor data Stream monitoring  Centralized - Response times 
-Tuple drops 
Aurora [17] Other data then 
human data 
Monitoring 
applications 
Centralized Resource allocation 
decisions 
TelegraphCQ 
[18] 
Sensor network Continuous queries 
processing 
Centralized  Scalable query 
processing 
Flexible Filters 
[23] 
Embedded 
application 
Dynamic load 
balancing  
Distributed -Load balancing for 
stateless and 
stateful operators 
-Redistributes the 
load on the fly. 
 
Arasu et al. [15] proposed a Data Stream Management System (DSMS), called STREAM, for STanford 
stREam data Manager. The challenges in building a DSMS instead of a traditional DBMS is to handle multiple 
continuous, unbounded, possibly rapid and time-varying data streams. Figure 1 shows the high level abstraction 
of stream data processing at DSMS. The incoming streams (on the left) produce data indefinitely and drive query 
processing. Processing of continuous queries typically requires intermediate states, stored as Scratch Store. This 
state could be stored and accessed in memory or on disk. Although we are concerned primarily with the online 
processing of continuous queries, in many applications stream data also may be copied to an archive, for 
preservation and possible offline processing of expensive analysis or mining queries.  
 Gulisano et al. [12][14] presented StreamCloud, a large scale data streaming system for processing large data 
stream in cloud environments. The proposed method is a highly scalable and elastic. StreamCloud runs on top of 
a distributed Stream Processing Engine (SPE), but is made independent from it by implementing the 
parallelization with standard stream administrators. Tatbul et al. [13] studied the problem of load shedding in 
distributed stream processing and show its difference from existing centralized solutions, and they offered several 
new practical algorithms for addressing the problem. The presented solution is a distributed algorithm called DFIT 
that works by transmitting its load requirements locally to its parents. They also investigated several centralized 
solutions a linear programming solution (Solver), a variant on Solver that takes a workload history into account 
(Solver-W), and a centralized version of our distributed algorithm (C-FIT) and compares them.  
Carney et al. [16] described the architecture of Aurora with the primitive building blocks for workflow 
processing, a DAHP system oriented towards monitoring applications. Abadi et al. [17] proposed a complete 
architecture of Aurora (a new model and architecture for data stream management for monitoring applications) 
and describe a stream-oriented set of operators. With several heuristics for optimizing a large Aurora network, 
they focused on run-time data storage and processing issues, discussing storage organization, real-time scheduling, 
introspection, and load shedding.  
The TelegraphCQ, a dataflow system for processing continuous queries over data streams which supports 
dynamic query workloads in volatile data streaming environments is presented by Chandrasekaran et al. in [18]. 
The TelegraphCQ DDL supports the creation of archived and unarchived streams that are fed with external sources 
using stream and source specific wrapper functions. For implementation, TelegraphCQ integrated with a sensor 
network and for simulation freeway traffic sensors used.  
In [23], overloaded operators trigger a reconfiguration of the load distribution policy with a “backpressure” 
message to upstream peers. However, the authors of [23] only consider stateless operators. SC provides load 
balancing for stateless and stateful operators and redistributes the load on the fly.   
2.2. Data Security  
 Cryptographic based security frameworks are proposed mainly in two different classes to protect data, i.e.  
Communication Security (data in motion) [9, 19, 48, 49] and Server side data security (data at rest) [26, 27, 30, 36].  
Authors in [9, 19] defined security requirements with descriptions of individual features such as Data 
Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Data Freshness, Availability, and Authentication. They also classified the layer wise 
security threats and exiting solutions (i.e. physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer) for wireless 
communication. They also proposed secure data collection and secure data transmission techniques in wireless 
networks. Both of these proposed techniques used symmetric key based cryptography.  
There are several solutions proposed in the literature to protect data in wireless networks and IoT environment. 
We grouped the security threats and solutions for different communication layers in Table 2.  For example, Jan et 
al. [48] proposed a novel detection scheme for Sybil attack in a centralized clustering-based hierarchical network. 
In [49], they have proposed a lightweight authentication scheme for IoT environment. Proposed scheme verifies 
the identities of the participating clients and servers in a CoAP-based and it follows a session key based solution.  
Table 2: Communication security threats and existing solutions 
Communication layers  Possible attacks  Security solutions  
Physical Layer  Jamming 
 Tampering 
 Spread spectrum communication 
 Jamming reports 
 Accurate and complete design of 
the node physical package 
Data Link Layer  Collision 
 Exhaustion 
 Unfairness 
 Interrogation Attack 
 SYBIL Attack 
 Error correcting codes 
 Collision detection and 
avoidance techniques 
 Rate limiting 
Network Layer  Selective Forwarding 
 Sinkhole 
 Sybil attack 
 Wormhole 
 HELLO flood 
 Spoofing and alternating routing 
information 
 Node capture/Node replication 
attack 
 Link layer encryption and 
authentication 
 Multipath routing 
 Identity verification 
 Authenticated broadcast 
Transport Layer  Flooding 
 DE synchronization 
Packet authentication including all 
control fields in the transport 
protocol header 
 
Server side data security is mainly proposed for physical data centers, when data is at rest and accessed through 
applications. There are several potential attacks for such data such as data interruption, interception, privacy 
breach, impersonation, session hijacking, programming flaws, software modification, software interruption, 
defacement, disrupting communications, hardware interruption, and hardware modification, etc. To overcome 
these attacks, several solutions have been proposed such as privacy in multitenant environments, data protection 
from disclosure, access control, software security, service availability, access control, application security, data 
security (data in transit, data at rest, reminisce), cloud management control security, virtual cloud protection, 
hardware security, and hardware reliability [26, 27, 30, 36]. We have classified the cloud based security threats 
and security requirements in Table 3. According to the recent research trend, we highlighted the cloud based 
security approach and the list of security requirements and threats, that are extensively from [26]. We describe a 
few techniques below as examples of such techniques.  
Liu et al. [27] proposed an authenticated key exchange scheme, called Cloud Computing Background Key 
Exchange (CCBKE). This proposed method is an efficient security-aware scheduling of scientific applications in 
hybrid computing environments such as cloud computing and designed based on the commonly-used Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) scheme and randomness-reuse strategy. Benantar et al. [30] introduced a method along with a 
corresponding framework for keeping up a safe relationship between a customer and a server in a distributed 
processing framework by registering a session identifier as a capacity of a Kerberos-based authentication ticket. 
The session identifier is freely inferred or confirmed by the client and the server upon first demand by the customer 
to the server and every consequent demand by the customer to the server is labeled with this session identifier to 
give a solid security affiliation.  
Table 3: Cloud service level wise security requirements and threats. 
Service Level Security requirements Threats 
Software as a Service 
(SaaS) 
 Privacy in multitenant 
 Environment 
 Data protection from disclosure 
 Data access  
 Software security 
 Authentication and 
Authorization   
 Interception 
 Data interruption (deletion) 
 Privacy breach 
 Impersonation 
 Session hijacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
Platform as a Service 
(PaaS) 
 Access control 
 Instruction Detection 
 Data security, (data in transit, 
data at rest, remanence) 
 Programming flaws 
 Software modification 
 Software interruption (deletion) 
Infrastructure as a Service 
(Iaas) 
 Virtual cloud protection 
 Communication security 
 physical security 
 Environmental security 
 Virtualization security 
 
 Impersonation 
 Session hijacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
 Exposure in network 
 Defacement 
 DDOS 
Physical Data Centre  Legal not abusive use of cloud 
computing 
 Hardware security  
 Hardware reliability  
 Network protection  
 Network resources protection  
 
 Network attacks 
 Connection flooding 
 DDOS 
 Hardware interruption, theft and 
modification 
 Misuse of infrastructure 
 Natural disasters 
 
In the following, our focus will be on existing security solutions for data stream. They mainly focus on access 
control and query level security [43, 44, 45].  Nehme et al. [43] initially highlighted the need for a security 
framework in streaming data. They divided the security problem into two: data security problem (also known as 
data security punctuation) and query security problem (also known as query security punctuation). Data security 
punctuation deals with data security, whereas query security punctuation deals with security and access control 
during the query processing. They extensively work on access control by focusing on both data security and query 
security punctuation in their papers [43, 44]. For example, FENCE, a continuous access control framework in 
dynamic data stream environments, deals with both data and query security restrictions [44]. It gives low overhead 
which is suitable for data stream environments. Similarly, ASSIST, an application system based on an effective 
and efficient access control framework, is proposed to protect streaming data from unauthorized access [45]. 
ASSIST has been implemented on top of StreamInsight, a commercial stream processing engine. This paper 
focuses on data security punctuation, where our security mechanism is to protect the data efficiently from potential 
attacks from/on untrusted intermediaries before the data reaches to the DSM. Wang et al. [46] proposed a 
framework named ARTSense, to trust without identity in participatory sensing networks. The proposed framework 
achieves the trust of information, reputation of participants, anonymity, and security requirements. 
The question is then can we apply existing communication and server side security to the big data stream to 
overcome the shortcomings of current approaches. Existing solutions for communication security or server side 
security do not satisfy the requirements of big data stream. We propose a novel light weight security mechanism 
for big data stream. The preliminary version of this paper contains the stream data processing architecture, security 
requirements followed by proposed a mechanism to address the security verification of big data stream (e.g., 
integrity, and authenticity) [47]. In this paper, we propose a solution, called Dynamic Prime Number Based 
Security Verification (DPBSV), which is based on a common shared key that is updated dynamically by 
generating synchronized pairs of prime numbers for real time security verification (i.e., confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity) on big data stream. We have shown the efficiency of our approach by reducing the security 
computation time and buffer utilization.  
3. Proposed Secure Data Stream Architecture 
3.1. Stream Processing  
Data stream processing is an emerging computing paradigm which is particularly suitable for application 
scenarios where huge amounts of data (Big Data) must be processed in near real-time (with small delay). Rather 
than processing stored data like in conventional clouds or database systems, Data Stream Manager (DSM) processes 
stream data on-the-fly. The needs of on-the-fly processing include the amount of input data that discourages the 
use of persistent storage, the requirement of providing prompt results, etc. DSM is designed to handle high-volume 
and bursty data streams from multiple sources. DSM handles streams of tuples similarly to the way a conventional 
database system handles relations. In addition, DSM needs to do the security verification of the data blocks on near 
real time to synchronize with stream data analysis.  
Figure 2 shows an overall architecture for a big data stream process from source sensing device to the cloud 
data processing center, including our proposed security framework on the data stream. It also shows the complete 
architecture of stream data processing in the data center of a cloud. Refer to [42] for further information on stream 
data processing in datacenter clouds. It starts with a three step process to reach data at DSM for stream processing. 
These three steps include collection, processing, and storing. All the query and security related processes are 
handled in DSM. It is important to note that the security verification of stream data has to be performed before 
query processing and it has to be done in real time (with small delay) with a fixed (small) buffer size. The processed 
data is stored in the cloud storage. Queries used in DSM are defined as “continuous” since they are continuously 
standing over the streaming data. Results are pushed to the user each time the streaming data satisfies the query 
predicate. The queries including security verification are defined as a directed acyclic graph where each node is an 
operator and edges define data flows. 
 
Figure 2. Overlay of our architecture from sensing device to cloud data processing center. 
A stream of data a potentially infinite sequence of tuples, denoted as (T1, T2, …, Tn). The data sources have 
clocks that are well synchronized with other system nodes as in [13]. A query is modeled as a network of connected 
operators. A connection represents a data flow. Typical query operators of DSMs are filter, map, union, join, and 
aggregate [12]. These operators correspond to relational algebra operators. Operators can be classified as stateless 
(filter, map and union) or stateful operators (join and aggregates) [14]. As the nature of the data stream is infinite, 
stateful operators perform their computation over sliding windows of tuples defined over a period of time (e.g. 
tuples received in the last hour).Cloud computing has become a platform of choice due to its extremely low-latency 
and massively parallel processing architecture [41]. It supports the most efficient way to obtain actionable 
information from big data streams [21-24].   
As discussed before fixed buffer size is required for security verification, here we present procedure to 
compute halting time of data block in buffer. Let there are n number of sensors and each send m number of data 
blocks. We assume that in a DSM buffer the probability of attempt to success security verification is (1 (𝑛 × 𝑚)⁄ ), 
or delays with probability 1 − (1 (𝑛 × 𝑚)⁄ ). We can compute Acquisition Probability as 𝐴 = (1 −
(
1
(𝑛×𝑚)
)
((𝑛×𝑚)−1)
) [34]. Based on the value of A, we can measure the halting time of the each individual data 
block; the halting time represented as w is A×(1 - A), where the value of w is inversely proportional to the value 
of A and processing time of DSM. 
It is clear from the above description that security verification at DSM is one of the important features of big 
data stream architecture. The major concern is to process security verification in real time because of the features 
of big data streams.  Security verification at DSM increases the stream query processing time. The major challenge 
of security processing time is that it should not introduce any time delay at DSM. This is critical for big data stream 
due to the high volume and velocity. Slow processing leads to the requirement of higher buffer size to store data 
before performing security verification. Hence, security verification should be done on-the-fly (with minimum 
delay). Motivated by this problem, this paper aims to address the challenge of real time security verification on 
massive data streams at DSM. 
3.2 Why symmetric key cryptography? 
Symmetric keys are smaller in size than asymmetric keys, so they require less computational burden. The 
ECRYPT II recommendations on key length say that a 128-bit symmetric key provides the same strength of 
protection as a 3,248-bit asymmetric key [8]. Our aim is to perform security verification on-the-fly (real-time). 
Symmetric key cryptography becomes a natural choice for this purpose. It is mentioned with a proof that symmetric 
key cryptography is approximately 1000 times faster than strong public key ciphers [7]. However, it is 
comparatively easy for an attacker to read/modify the data as the symmetric key cryptography key length is small 
[7]. To overcome this problem, we use a synchronized dynamic prime number (Pi) generation algorithm at both 
source and DSM with equal interval of time in order to update cryptography keys dynamically to confuse malicious 
attackers. The procedure Prime(Pi) is calculated and synchronized on both sides as shown in Figure 3. This proposal 
makes the process faster and prevents potential attacks on the data streams. We explain it in detail in a later section. 
 
Figure 3. Pair of dynamic relative prime number generation, one at DSM, and another in distributed sensor node, are maintained with a 
standard time interval. Information is communicated from the sensors to the DSM only if encrypted with the Pi based secret key. 
3.3 Sensor Node Processing Power  
Power consumption of the sensor node broadly divided into three domains: sensing, data processing and 
communication. The processing unit of a smart dust mote prototype is a 4 MHz Atmel AVR8535 micro-controller 
with 8 KB instruction flash memory, 512 bytes RAM and 512 bytes EEPROM [4]. TinyOS operating system is 
used on this processor, which has 3500 bytes OS code space and 4500 bytes available code space [5]. In [6], the 
authors mentioned that the Mica2 mote – based on the Atmel ATMega 128L microcontroller – takes roughly 3.2 
nJ per instruction; Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller corresponds to an energy consumption of roughly 
750 pJ per instruction and smart dust micro architecture designed in 0.25 µm technology system consumes 12 pJ 
per instruction. In [1, 2], Walravens et al. proved that folded tree based processing is more efficient than other 
traditional processing techniques. The folded tree is 8 to 10 times more efficient that MSP430 in terms of energy 
and 2 to 3 times faster in terms of execution time. It also reduces the processing power to 80 uW or 8 pJ/cycle. 
In our proposed architecture in Figure 2, we generate prime numbers at both sensors and DSM. We adapted the 
folded tree based approach as it is suitable and capable of calculating the prime number after equal intervals of time 
in the range up to 107 within 18 milliseconds [3].  
We also assume that deployed source nodes operate in two modes: trusted and untrusted. In the trusted mode, 
the nodes operate in a cryptographically secure space and adversaries cannot penetrate this space. Nodes can 
incorporate Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to design trusted mode of operation. The TPM is a dedicated security 
chip following the Trust Computing standard specification for cryptographic microcontroller systems [10]. TPM 
provides a cost effective way of “hardening” many recently deployed applications, those are previously based on 
software encryption algorithms with keys kept on a host’s disk [11]. It provides a hardware based trust, which 
contains cryptographic functionality like key generation, store, and management in hardware. The detailed 
architecture is at [11]. We assume that the proposed prime number generation procedure Prime (Pi) and secret key 
calculation operate in the trusted mode.  
4. Dynamic Prime-Number Based Security Verification– DPBSV 
We describe our DPBSV scheme for big sensing data streams using four independent components: system 
setup, handshaking, rekeying, and security verification. We refer readers to Table 4 for all notations used in 
describing our scheme. We have made a number of sensible a practical assumptions while characterizing our 
scheme. We describe those assumptions where necessary. We next describe four independent components in 
details. 
Table 4. Notations 
Acronym Description 
𝑆𝑖   i
th Sensor’s ID. 
𝐾𝑖 i
th Sensor’s Secret key. 
𝐾𝑠𝑖  i
th Sensor’s  Session Key. 
𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 Generated key for the authentication. 
𝐾𝑆𝐻 Secret key calculated by the sensor and DSM. 
𝐾𝑆𝐻− Previous secret shared key maintain at DSM. 
𝐾/𝐾′ Encrypted with sensor’s secret key for user authentication. 
𝐶/𝐶′/𝐶′′ Calculated hash value. 
𝑟 Pseudorandom number generated by the sensors. 
𝑡 Interval time to generate the prime number. 
𝑃𝑖  Random prime number. 
𝐾𝑑 Secret key of the DSM. 
k Initial shared key for sensor and DSM for authentication. 
j Integrity checking interval. 
𝐼𝐷 Encrypted data for integrity check. 
𝐴𝐷 Secret key for authenticity check. 
𝐸( ) Encryption function. 
𝐻( ) One-way hash function. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖) Random prime number generation function. 
KeyGen Key generation procedure. 
⊕ Bitwise X-OR operation. 
∥ Concatenation operation. 
𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 Fresh data at sensor before encryption. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦 ( ) Retrieve key from DSM database by knowing specific source.   
𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦( ) Randomly generate the key.  
4.1 DPBSV System setup 
We assume that DSM has all deployed sensors’ identities (IDs) and secret keys at the time of deployment because 
the network is fully untrusted. We use a number of key exchanges between the sensors and DSM at the start to 
ensure that session key establishment process is secured. Since we are transmitting key functions such as KeyGen 
to individual source sensors later, it is important that all potential attacks are considered while establishing the 
session key. We also assume that each sensor node Si knows the identity of its DSM. Further, both DSM and 
sensors maintain a same secret key (i.e., k) for initial authentication process. In our scheme, we also assume that 
sensors never communicate between each other to reduce the communication overhead. The step wise secure 
authentication process shown in Figure 4.   
Step 1: 
In the first step, a sensor sends {Si, r} to the DSM, where Si is the sensor identity and r a pseudorandom number. 
If there are n numbers of sensors deployed in the area such as S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn ,Si denotes  the id of ith sensor.  
1) Si → DSM: {Si, r}. 
Step 2:  
When the DSM receives {Si, r} from a sensor Si, it first retrieves Si’s secret key, i.e., 𝐾𝑖 ← 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦 (𝑆𝑖). 
DSM then generates a random session key 𝐾𝑠𝑖 . In order to share this with the corresponding senor (Si), DSM 
generates a key using the session key and the corresponding sensor’s private key ( i.e., 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 𝐾𝑠𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖). Then 
DSM encrypts the generated key with the shared key k (i.e.,  𝐾 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑠𝑖 , 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐)) and performs the hash function to 
generate C ( i.e. 𝐶 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 𝑟)). Finally, DSM sends the value of C and 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐  to Si. The complete 
computational steps is listed below.  
𝐾𝑖 ← 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑆𝑖), 
𝐾𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦( ), 
𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 𝐾𝑠𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖 ,  
𝐾 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑠𝑖 , 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐) 
𝐶 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 𝑟)           (1) 
2) Si ← DSM: { 𝐶, 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐}  
 Step 3:  
The corresponding sensor gets { 𝐶, 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐}  from DSM and starts calculating its session key from 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐  based on 
its own secret key (i.e., 𝐾𝑠𝑖 = 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖). The sensor finds out the value of 𝐾
′ based on the value of 𝐾𝑠𝑖  and 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐  
(i.e. 𝐾′ = 𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑠𝑖 , 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐)) by using the initial secret key k. It  then gets the hash 𝐻(𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾′ ∥ 𝑟) from Equation 1 
and checks whether or not it is equal to C. If the hashes are equal and 𝐾 = 𝐾′, DSM is authenticated to the sensor 
Si. However, if it is not equal, then Si ends the protocol. Following the authentication, it transmits 𝐶′ = 𝐻(1 ∥
𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾′ ∥ 𝑟) to DSM as follows]. 
𝐾𝑠𝑖 = 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖  .  
𝐾′ = 𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑠𝑖 , 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐) 
𝐻(𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾′ ∥ 𝑟) 
𝐾 = 𝐾′ , to authenticate the DSM 
𝐶′ = 𝐻(1 ∥ 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾′ ∥ 𝑟)          (2) 
3) Si → DSM: { 𝐶′}. 
 Step 4:  
When the DSM receives 𝐶′ from the sensor, it  compares the value of  with 𝐻(1 ∥ 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 𝑟), which is 
computed from Equation 2 to see whether they are equal. Si is authenticated by DMS id the values are equal 
Otherwise, the protocol is terminated. After authentication of both parties, the DSM and sensors have the session 
key 𝐾𝑠𝑖 . DSM sends 𝐶′′ = 𝐻(2 ∥ 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 𝑟) to complete the protocol.    
𝐶′′ = 𝐻(2 ∥ 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 𝑟)           (3) 
4) Si ← DSM: { 𝐶′′}  
 
Figure 4. Secure Authentication process between source sensing device and DSM, and Handshaking.  
4.2 DPBSV Handshaking 
The individual session keys are established using the DPBSV system setup described in the earlier sub-section. 
Using the established session keys, the DSM sends its all properties (shows in step 5) to sensors (S1, S2, S2, …, Sn). 
In general, if a larger prime number of secret shares is used in the pairwise key establishment process, the better 
security will the pairwise key achieve. However, using a larger prime number for the secret shares requires a greater 
computation time. In order to make the security verification lighter and faster, we reduce the prime number size. 
Towards this, we have defined a new dynamic prime number generation function 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖), which will be 
described later in Theorem 2. Our aim is to calculate the prime number on both sensor and DSM sides to reduce 
communication overhead and minimize the chances of disclosing the shared key.  This is achieved by installing the 
same function at both sides as follows: 
 Step 5:  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖) computes the relative prime number on both sides with a time interval t.  In the handshaking process, 
DSM transmits all its procedures to generate the key and prime number like (𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡,  𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖),  𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛) 
to individual sensors by encrypting with the initial shared key (k). These parameters and procedures are explained 
in a later section in details.  
5) Si ← DSM: {𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑃𝑖), 𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)}   
In this step, DSM sends all the parameters and properties of KeyGen to source sensors. All of this transferred 
information is stored in trusted parts of sensor (e.g. TPM). Figure 4 shows the handshaking after authentication 
between source sensor and DSM. It is important to note that once the function is compromised, the whole security 
protocol and system is also compromise. Hence, it is important to ensure that the sensors have trusted part built in. 
4.3 DPBSV Rekeying 
We propose a novel rekeying concept by calculating prime numbers dynamically on both source sensors and 
DSM. Figure 3 shows the synchronization of the shared key. In our scheme, a smaller size of the key makes the 
security verification faster. But we change the key very frequently in the DPBSV rekeying process to ensure that 
the protocol remains secure. If any types of damage happens at the source, the corresponding sensor is 
desynchronized with DSM. The source sensor follows Step 3 to reinitialize and synchronize with DSM. According 
to our assumption, we store all the secret information at a trusted part of the sensor. So the sensor can reinitialize 
the synchronization by sending its own identity to DSM. Once DSM authenticates the source sensor, it sends the 
current key and time of key generation. Authenticated sensors can update the next key by using the key generation 
process from a secure module of the sensor (TPM). In several situations, data blocks can arrive at DSM after 
rekeying process, those data blocks encrypted with previous shared key. We add a time stamp field to individual 
data packet to identify the encrypted shared key. If the data is encrypted using previous shared key then the DSM 
uses 𝐾𝑆𝐻− key for the security verification; otherwise, it follows the normal process. The shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻−always 
initialize the with current 𝐾𝑆𝐻 before 𝐾𝑆𝐻 update.  
Rekeying is often accomplished by running initial exchanges all over again.  The following presents an 
alternative approach to rekeying and the corresponding analysis in terms of efficiency.  
 Step 6: 
The above defined DPBSV Handshaking process makes sensors aware about the Prime (Pi) and KeyGen. We 
now describe the complete secure data transmission and verification process using those functions and keys. As 
mentioned above, our scheme uses the synchronized dynamic prime number generation Prime (Pi) on both sides, 
i.e., sensors and DSM as shown in Figure 3.  At the end of the handshaking process, sensors have their own secret 
keys, initial prime number and initial shared key generated by the DSM. The next prime generation process is based 
on the current prime number and the given time interval. Sensors generate the shared key   𝐾𝑆𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐸(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑)) 
using the prime number 𝑃𝑖  and DSM secret key  𝐾𝑑 . Each data block is associated with the authentication tag and 
contains two different parts. One is encrypted DATA based on its secret key 𝐾𝑖 and shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 for integrity 
checking (i.e., 𝐼𝐷 = 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖 ), and the other part is for the authentication checking (i.e., 𝐴𝐷 = 𝑆𝑖 ⊕
𝐾𝑆𝐻). The resulting data block is: ((𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) ∥ (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻)). The key generation and individual block 
encryption process listed are as follows. 
𝐾𝑆𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐸(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑))           (4) 
𝐼𝐷 = 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖  
𝐴𝐷 = 𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻   
6) Si → DSM: { 𝐸𝑘(𝐼𝐷 ∥ 𝐴𝐷)}.  
 
Figure 5. Shared key update and security verification process.  
4.4 DPBSV Security Verification 
Security verification should be performed in real time (with minimal delay) based on the features of big data 
streams stated above. In the following step we perform the security verification of our proposed scheme. In this 
step, DSM verifies for authenticity in each individual data block and for integrity in specific selected data blocks. 
The aim is to maintain the end-to-end security of the proposed scheme.  
 Step 7: 
The DSM verifies whether the data is modified or comes from an authenticated node. As DSM has the common 
initial shared key, it decrypts the complete block to find out the individual data blocks for the integrity and 
authenticity check. The DSM first checks for the authenticity in each data block 𝐴𝐷 and checks for the integrity 
with random of interval data blocks 𝐼𝐷. This random value is calculated based on the corresponding prime number 
i.e. 𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖% 7. The calculated values vary from 0 to 6, i.e., the maximum interval of 6 blocks and if the value of j 
is 0, then it will not skip any data block. For the authenticity check, the DSM decrypts 𝐴𝐷with shared key 𝑆𝑖 =
𝐴𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 . Once Si is obtained, the DSM checks its source database and extracts the corresponding secret key 𝐾𝑖  
for the integrity check according to the value of j. Given 𝐾𝑖, the DSM calculates/decrypts data and checks MAC 
for integrity check 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 = 𝐼𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖 . All the security verification process from based on shared key from 
Equation 4. Figure 5 shows the security verification with rekeying process. 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝐴𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻  
𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 = 𝐼𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖   
Algorithm 1. Security Framework for Big Sensing Data Stream 
Description Based on the dynamic prime number generation at both source sensor and DSMsides, 
the proposed security protocol for big sensing data streams works more efficiently 
without compromising security strength. 
Input prime generation process 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖), key generation process 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛, sensor and 
DSM secret key, and session key 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐for handshaking.   
Output Successful security verification without any malicious attack and comparatively faster 
security verification than standard symmetric key solution (AES).  
Step 1 DPBSV System setup 
1.1 Si → DSM: {Si, r}, ith sensor sends its random number with its identity 
1.2 Si ← DSM: { 𝐶, 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐}, DSM identifies the sensor and generates the session key for it. Then 
DSM encrypts and sends back to the ith sensor 
1.3 Si → DSM: { 𝐶′}, ith sensor identifies the DSM based on its own secret key. If sender is not 
authenticated then it starts authentication transaction. 
1.4 Si ← DSM: { 𝐶′′} DSM authenticates the last transaction and sends back to ith sensor with this 
format. Otherwise protocol terminates to start the new process. 
Step 2 DPBSV Handshaking 
DSM sends its properties to individual sensors based on their individual session key. It includes 
the prime number generation and time interval to generation etc. 
2.1 DSM ← Si: {𝐸𝑘(𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖),  𝐾𝑆𝐻, 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)}, for details refer Table 4. 
Step 3 DPBSV Rekeying 
Key updates on both source sensor and DSM and they are aware of the Prime (Pi) and KeyGen. 
Sensors generate the shared key   𝐾𝑆𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐸(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑)) and each data block is associated with 
two different parts. One is encrypted i.e., 𝐼𝐷 = 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖 and another for authenticity 
checking i.e., 𝐴𝐷 = 𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻. 
3.1 Si → DSM: { 𝐸𝑘(𝐼𝐷 ∥ 𝐴𝐷)}, these blocks for authentication, integration, and confidentiality 
checks. 
Step 4 DPBSV Security Verification 
The DSM checks for authenticity in each data block 𝐴𝐷 and checks for the integrity with random 
interval data blocks 𝐼𝐷 and random value is calculated based on the corresponding prime 
number i.e. 𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖% 7.  
4.1 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐴𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 
For the authenticity check, the DSM gets source ID. Once Si obtained, the DSM checks source 
database and extracts corresponding secret key 𝐾𝑖 for the integrity check according to the value 
of j.  
4.2 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 = 𝐼𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖 
Given 𝐾𝑖, the DSM calculates/decrypts data and checks MAC for integrity check. 
The complete mechanism beginning from source sensing device and DSM authentication to handshaking, 
security verification mentioned in algorithmic format is shown in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 represents the 
description of the proposed mechanism in the stepwise process.  
5. Security Analysis of DPBSV 
This section provides theoretical analysis of our scheme to show that the proposed scheme is safe against attacks 
on authenticity, confidentiality and integrity.  
5.1 Assumptions 
We have made a number of practical and realistic assumption in our scheme. In the following, we first describe 
those assumptions.  
Assumption 1: In our scheme,  the data that was encrypted by a symmetric-key algorithm cannot be decrypted by 
any parties, unless they have the session/shared key which was used to encrypt the data at the source (or sensor) 
side. 
Assumption 2: DSM is fully trusted and no parties can access the DSM without proper authentication.  
Assumption 3: Sensor’s secret key, Prime (Pi) and secret key calculation procedures reside inside trusted parts 
of the sensor (like TPM) so that no one is authorized to access and manipulate them.  
5.2 Threat Model 
We define our threat model which is similar to the most cryptological analyses to shared-key communication 
protocols as follows:  
Definition 1 (attack on authentication): A malicious attacker Ma is an adversary who is capable of monitoring, 
intercepting, and introducing itself as an authenticated source node to send data in the data stream. The types of 
attacks possible in this category include impersonation attack, Sybil attack, and identity-based attacks [19].  
Definition 2 (attack on confidentiality): A malicious attacker Mc is an unauthorized party who has the ability to 
access or view the unauthorized data stream before it reaches DSM. The types of attacks in this categories include 
phishing attack, packet sniffing, and dumpster driving [19].   
Definition 3 (attack on integrity): A malicious attacker Mi attack on integrity, which is an adversary capable of 
monitoring the data stream regularly and try to access and modify the data blocks before it reaches DSM. The 
types of attacks in this category includes salami attack, data diddling attacks, man in the middle attack and session 
hijacking attack [19].  
5.3 Security Proof 
In this sub-section, we show that our scheme is safe against the threat model in Section 5.2 under the assumptions 
explained in Section 5.1. This is achieved through six theorems and corresponding proofs as follows.    
Theorem 1: The security is not compromised against the threat model by reducing the size of shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻).    
Proof: We reduce the size of the prime number to make the key generation process faster and more efficient. The 
ECRYPT II recommendations on key length say that a 128-bit symmetric key provides the same strength of 
protection as a 3,248-bit asymmetric key. Low length of key also provides more security in a symmetric key 
algorithm because it is never shared publicly. Advanced processor (Intel i7 Processor) took about 1.7 nanoseconds 
to try out one key from one block. With this speed it would take about 1.3 × 1012 × the age of the universe to 
check all the keys from the possible key set [8]. By reducing the size of the prime number, we fixed the key length 
to 64-bit to make the security verification faster at DSM using the data from Table 5. From Table 5, a 64-bit 
symmetric key takes 3136e +19 nanoseconds (more than a month), so we fixed interval time to generate prime 
number as a week (i.e. t=168 hours). Dynamic shared key calculates based on the calculated prime number. Based 
on this calculation, we conclude that an attacker cannot calculate within the interval time t. We are changing the 
shared key without exchanging information between the sensors and DSM. Brute-force attack me be able to get 
the shared key once intruder have key length, but this possibilities also associate with 128-bit cryptographic 
solution. It confuses the malicious node those are listening the data flow continuously. The key has already been 
changed four times before an attacker knows the key and this knowledge is not known to the attackers. Which 
conclude that even we reduced the key size to 64 bit, we get the same security strength by changing the key in 
time interval t.  
Table 5. Notations Symmetric key (AES) algorithm takes time to get all possible keys using most advanced Intel i7 Processor. 
Key Length 8 16 32 64 128 
Key domain size 256 65536 4.295e+09 1.845e +19 3.4028e+38 
Time (in nanoseconds) 1435.2 1e+05 7.301e+09 3136e +19 5.7848e+35 
 
It is important to note that a malicious attacker can find a key and decrypt the data if it can hold the data longer 
than the time interval t. Even in such situation, the scheme is safe from attacks on authentication and integrity, but 
not strong confidentiality. This means the scheme supports weak confidentiality. However, this scheme is equally 
safe to use in scenario where confidentiality of the data expired after certain time like in emergency management 
scenario (where the authenticity and integrity of the data is important). We plan to address this issue in our future 
work.  
Theorem 2:  Relative prime number Pi calculated in Algorithm 2 synchronizes between the source sensors (Si) 
and DSM.     
Proof: The normal method to check the prime number is 6k+1, ∀k∈ N+ (an integer). Here, we initially initialize 
the value of k based on this primary test formula. Our prime generation method is based on this concept and from 
the extended idea of [3]. In our scheme, the input Pi is the currently used prime number (initialized by DSM) and 
the return Pi is the calculated new prime number. Intially Pi is intialized by the DSM at DPBSV Handshaking 
process and the interval time is t seconds.  
From Algorithm 2, we calculate the new prime number 𝑃𝑖  based on the previous one 𝑃𝑖−1. The complete process 
of the prime number calculation is based on the value of m and m is initialized from the value k which itself is 
derived using 𝑃𝑖 . The value of k is constant at source because it is calculated from the current prime number, which 
is is initialized during DPBSV Handshaking. Since the value of k is the same on both sides, the procedure Prime 
(Pi) returns identical values. In Algorithm 2, the value of S(m) is computed as follows.  
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If 𝑆(𝑥) = 1 from equation 5 then x is prime, otherwise x is not a prime.  
The following procedure validates the above features 
𝑥 ≢ 0 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑖 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ x − 1, if x is prime 
Then put the value of x as a prime number, then  
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∀ k within the specified range i.e 107, then 
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Same S2(𝑥) is also 1 as shown in Equation 6 and then 
 𝑆(𝑥) =
S1(x)+S2(x)
2
= 1  
Hence, the property of 𝑆(𝑥) is proved.   
Algorithm 2. Dynamic Prime Number Generation 
Prime (𝑷𝒊) 
1. 𝑃𝑖−1 = 𝑃𝑖 
2. Set 𝑘 ∶= ⌈
𝑃𝑖−1
6
⌉     
3. Set 𝑚 ∶= 6𝑘 + 1                              // Next prime number. 
4. If 𝑚 ≥ 107 then 
5. 𝑘 ∶= 𝑘 105⁄  
6. GO TO: 3 
7. If S(𝑚) = 1 then                             // From Equation 5. 
8. GO TO: 14                               // If m is a prime number. 
9. Set 𝑚 ∶= 6𝑘 + 5                              // Next possible prime number. 
10. If S(𝑚) = 1 then                             // From Equation 5. 
11. GO TO: 14                               // If m is a prime number.                     
12. 𝑘 ∶= ⌊𝑘3 + √𝑘⌋ 𝑚𝑜𝑑 17 + 𝑘           // Relative number calculation. 
13. GO TO: 3 
14. 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑚 
15. Return (𝑃𝑖)                                        // Calculated new prime number. 
Theorem 3: Shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻) is always synchronize between Source sensor (Si) and DSM in DPBSV security 
mechanism.  
Proof: From our proposed mechanism 𝐾𝑆𝐻− always initialize by the value of 𝐾𝑆𝐻, before 𝐾𝑆𝐻 update. According 
to the shared key generation process (i.e. 𝐾𝑆𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐸(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑))), rekeying process need the value of dynamic prime 
number (Pi) and other than this value are constant. So computed value of 𝐾𝑆𝐻 is always same if rekeying process 
use same Pi, and from theorem 2 we conclude that the value of Pi always same at Si and DSM in time interval t. 
So there is always same shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻) for Si and DSM in the time interval. 
Theorem 4: An attacker Ma cannot read the secret information from sensor node (Si) or introduce itself as an 
authenticated node in DPBSV. 
Proof: Following Definition 1, we know that an attacker Ma can gain access to the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 by monitoring 
the network thoroughly, but Ma cannot get secret information such as Prime (Pi) and KeyGen. Considering the 
computational hardness of secure module (assumption 3), we know that Ma cannot get the secret information for 
Pi generation, Ki and KeyGen. So there are no possibilities for the malicious node to trap sensor and process 
according to it, but Ma can introduce him/herself as the authenticated node to send its information. In our scheme, 
sensor (Si) sends((𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) ∥ (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻)), where the second part of the data block (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻) is 
used for the authentication check. DSM decrypts this part of the data block for an authentication check. DSM 
retrieves Si after decryption and matches corresponding Si within its database. If the calculated Si matches with 
the DSM database, it accepts; otherwise, it rejects the node as source and it is not an authenticated sensor node. 
All required secured information for prime number and key generation procedure is stored at trusted parts of the 
sensor node (i.e., assumption 3). According to assumption 3, an attacker cannot get the information as discussed 
before. Hence, we conclude that attacker Ma cannot attack big data streams. 
It is important to note that the proposed scheme avoids or drops the data blocks which are from malicious sources 
with minimum computation time by processing (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻) only during authentication. This also addresses the 
attacks on availability, one of the key security features, by avoiding potential DDoS attack.  
Theorem 5: An attacker Mc cannot access or view the unauthorized data stream in our proposed DPBSV.  
Proof: It is clear from Algorithm 2 that a prime number 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑃𝑖) is generated at sensors and DSM dynamically 
without any further communication. Shared secret key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 is computed using the generated prime number. 
Considering the Assumption 3, we know that Mc cannot get the secret information for Pi generation, Ki and 
KeyGen within the time frame. Following the Definition 2, we know that an attacker Mc can gain access to the 
shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 but no other information. In our scheme, a source sensor (Si) sends data blocks in the format like 
((𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) ∥ (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻)), where the first part of the data block (𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) contains the 
original data. Getting the original data (𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴) is impossible from this because Mc does not have other information 
and at the same time shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 updates dynamically at equal intervals of time (t). As the data is protected 
and cannot be read within the time frame (i.e., before the update of shared key is occurred), we say that the 
proposed mechanism provide weak confidentiality. Though this weak confidentiality is acceptable in many 
applications, we plan to address this issue in our future work.   
Theorem 6: An attacker Mi cannot read the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 within the time interval t in DPBSV scheme.  
Proof: Following Definition 3, we know that an attacker Mi has full access to the network to read the shared 
key 𝐾𝑆𝐻, but Mi cannot get correct secret information such as KSH. Considering the method described in Theorem 
1, we know that Mi cannot get the currently used KSH  within the time interval t, because our proposed scheme 
calculates Pi randomly after time t and then uses the value Pi to generate KSH. For more details on computation 
analysis, we refer readers to Theorem 1. 
5.4 Forward Secrecy 
As with other symmetric key procedures, shared keys used for encrypting communications are only used for 
certain periods of time (t) until the new prime number is generated. Thus, a previously used shared key or secret 
keying material is worthless to a malicious opponent even when a previously-used secret key is known to the 
attackers. This is one of the major advantages of frequent changing of the shared key. This is one of the reasons we 
did not choose symmetric key cryptography or an asymmetric-key encryption algorithm. However, if the attackers 
monitor and keep all data for a long period of time, they can find the keys to decrypt the data. This will break the 
confidentiality of the data, but the integrity and authenticity are maintained. However, with dynamic change of the 
keys and not knowing the internal process, it is always difficult to figure out which data to be kept for the potential 
confidentiality attacks.  
6 Experiment and Evaluation  
The proposed DPBSV  scheme is generic even though it is deployed in big sensing data streams in this paper. 
In order to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed scheme, even under adverse conditions, we 
observe each individual data blocks for authentication checks and selected data blocks for integrity attacks. The 
integrity attack verification interval is dynamic in nature and the data verification is done at the DSM only.  
To validate our proposed scheme, we experimented in multiple simulation environments to validate that our 
security mechanism works perfectly in big sensing data streams. We first measured the performance of sensor 
nodes using COOJA in Contiki OS [37], then verified the security scheme using Scyther [38], and finally measured 
the efficiency of the scheme using JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment) [39]. We also checked the minimum 
buffer size required to process our proposed scheme and compared with the standard AES algorithm. 
6.1 Sensor Node Performance 
We experimented with the performance of the sensor in COOJA simulator in Contiki OS. We took the two 
most common types of sensor, i.e., Z1 and TmoteSky sensors, for our experiment and performance checking as 
shown in Figure 6. In this experiment, we check the performance of sensors while computing or updating the 
shared key.   
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 6. The sensors used for experiment (a) Z1 low power sensor. (b) TmoteSky ultra low power sensor. 
Z1 sensor nodes are produced by Zolertia, which is a low-power WSN module that is designed as a general 
purpose development platform for WSN researchers. It is designed for maximum backwards compatibility with 
the successful Tmote like family motes while improving the performance and maximum flexibility and 
expandability with regards to any combination of power-supplies, sensors and connectors. It supports the open 
source operating systems currently employed by the WSN community, like Contiki [37]. COOJA is a network 
simulator for Contiki, which provides real time sensor node features to simulate.  
A Z1 sensor node is equipped with the low power microcontroller MSP430F2617, which features a powerful 
16-bit RISC CPU @16MHz clock speed, built-in clock factory calibration, 8KB RAM and a 92KB Flash memory. 
Z1 hardware selection guarantees maximum efficiency and robustness with low energy cost. As TmoteSky is 
ultra-low power sensor, it is equipped with the low power microcontroller MSP430F1611, which has built-in 
clock factory calibration, 10KB RAM and a 48KB Flash memory. 
 
Figure 7. Estimated power consumption during the key generation process 
We successfully demonstrated in the COOJA Simulator that our key generation process works successfully in 
both types of sensors i.e. z1 sensor and TmoteSky sensor. These sensors support our security mechanism. The 
energy consumption during the key generation process is shown in Figure 7. This shows the normal power 
consumption behavior for the key generation process. From this experiment we conclude that our proposed 
security verification mechanism DPBSV is supported by most common types of sensors and feasible for big 
sensing data streams.   
6.2 Security Verification  
The scheme is written in the Scyther simulation environment using Security Protocol Description Language 
(.spdl). According to the features of Scyther, we define the role of D and S, where S is the sender (i.e. sensor 
nodes) and D is the recipient (i.e.,DSM). In our scenario, D and S have all the required information that is 
exchanged during the handshake process. This enables D and S to update their own shared key.  S sends the data 
packets to D and D performs the security verification. In our simulation, we introduce three types of attacks. The 
first type of attack is defined for the transmission between S and D (integrity), the second attack is defined where 
an adversary acquires the property of S and sends the attack data packets to D (authentication) and the third attack 
is defined adversary try to read the data within interval t (Confidentiality). In our experiments, we evaluated all 
packets at D (DSM) for security verification. We experimented with 100 numbers of runs for each claim to found 
out the number of attacks at D as shown in Figure 8. Apart from these, we follow the default properties of Scyther.   
Attack model: Many types of cryptographic attacks can be considered. In our case, we focus on integrity 
attacks, confidentiality attacks and authentication attacks as discussed above. In integrity attacks, an attacker can 
only observe encrypted data blocks/packets travelling on the network that contain information about sensed data 
as shown in Figure 2. The attacker can perform a brute force attack on captured packets by systematically testing 
every possible key, and we assumed that he/she is able to determine when the attack is successful. In 
confidentiality attack, attacker continuously observe the data flow and try to read the data. In authentication 
attacks, an attacker can observe a source node, and try to get the behaviour of the source node. We assume that 
he/she is able to determine the source node’s behaviour. In such cases, the attacker can introduce an authenticated 
node and act as the original source node. In our concept, we are using trusted modules in sensors to store the secret 
information and procedure for key generation and encryption (such as TPM).  
 
Figure 8. Scyther simulation environment with parameters and result page of successful security verification at DSM. 
Experiment model: In practice, attacks may be more sophisticated and efficient than brute force attacks. 
However, this does not affect the validity of the proposed DPBSV scheme as we are interested in efficient security 
verification without periodic key exchanges and successful attacks. Here, we model the process as described in 
the previous section and fixed the key size at 64 bits (see Table 5). We used Scyther, an automatic security 
protocols verification tool, to verify our proposed mechanism.  
Results: We did our simulation using variable numbers of data blocks in each run. Our experiment ranges from 
100 to 1000 instances with 100 intervals. We check authentication for each data block, whereas the integrity check 
is performed on the selected data blocks. As our secure information such as 𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖),  𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 
are stored within the trusted module of the sensor, no one can get access to that information except the 
corresponding sensor. Without this information, attackers cannot authenticate encrypted data blocks. Hence, we 
did not find any attacks for authentication checks. For integrity attacks, it is hard to get the shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻), as 
we are frequently changing the shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻) based on the dynamic prime number 𝑃𝑖  on both source sensor 
(𝑆𝑖) and DSM. In the experiment, we did not encounter any attack in integrity check. As the shared key is changing 
with time interval t, attacker cannot read data stream within the time interval. Which conclude that our proposed 
mechanism provide weak confidentiality. Figure 8 shows the result of security verification experiments in the 
Scyther environment. This shows that our scheme is secured from integrity, authentication and confidential 
(within the time interval t) attacks even after reduced key size. As we are updating the rekey process in equal 
interval of time, we found our scheme is secured with 64 bit key length. From the observations above, we can 
conclude that our proposed scheme is secure. 
6.3 Performance Comparison 
Experiment model: It is clear that the actual efficiency improvement brought by our scheme highly depends 
on the size of key and rekeying without further communication between sensor and DSM. We have performed 
experiments with different sizes of data blocks. The results of our experiments are given below. 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been a standard symmetric key algorithm since 1977. However, it can 
be cracked quickly and inexpensively. In 2000, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31] replaced the DES 
to meet the ever-increasing requirements of data security. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known 
as the Rijndael algorithm, is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt data blocks of 128 bits using symmetric 
keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits [31, 32, 35]. AES was introduced to replace the Triple DES (3DES) algorithm used 
for a good amount of time universally. AES was acquainted with supplant the Triple DES (3DES) algorithm utilized 
for a decent measure of time all around. Hence, we have compared our proposed solution against advanced 
encryption standard (AES), the standard symmetric key encryption algorithm [31, 32]. Our scheme efficiency is 
compared with two standard symmetric key algorithm such as 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES. This performance 
comparison experiment was carried out in JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment), and we compared the processing 
time with different data block size. This comparison is based on the features of JCE in Java virtual machine version 
1.6 64 bit. JCE is the standard extension to the Java platform which provides a framework implementation for 
cryptographic methods. We experimented with many-to-one communication. All sensor nodes communicate to the 
single node (DSM). All sensors have similar properties whereas the destination node has the properties of DSM 
(more powerful to initialize the process). The rekey process is executed at all the nodes without any 
intercommunication. Processing time of data verification is measured at the DSM node. Our experimental results 
are shown in Figure 9; the result validates the theoretical analysis presented in Section 5. 
Results: The performance of our scheme is better than the standard AES algorithm when different sizes of data 
blocks are considered. Figure 9 shows the processing time of the proposed DPBSV scheme in comparison with 
base 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES for different sizes of the data block. The performance comparison shows that 
our proposed scheme is efficient and faster than the baseline AES protocols.  
 
 
Figure 9. Performance of our scheme compared in efficiency to 128 bit AES and 256 bit AES. 
We calculated the time taken for DPBSV encryption and decryption in AMD K7-700 MHz processor and 
compare with standard AES-128 bit algorithm [33]. Based on our calculation DPBSV takes 3.2 microseconds and 
AES (128-bit) 35.8 microseconds for encryption, whereas DPBSV takes 3.3 microseconds and AES (128-bit) 36 
microseconds for decryption.  
6.4 Required Buffer Size  
Experiment model: We evaluated the required buffer size for DSM by using the MATLAB as the simulation 
tool [40]. The buffer size is computed using the performance time shown in Figure 9 (i.e. security verification 
time). We calculated the minimum required buffer size for DPBSV for high speed input data stream (i.e. MB/S). 
The security verification time is measured with input data size in Byte, and we scale the data rate to MB/S for 
buffer computation. We compared our scheme with the standard 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES. We calculated 
the minimum buffer size required to process security verification at DSM with various data rate starts from 50 to 
200 MB/S with 50 MB/S interval.  
Results: The performance of our scheme is better than the standard AES algorithm. Figure 10 shows the 
minimum buffer size required to  perform security verification at DSM for the proposed DPBSV scheme. We also 
show the compare the results with base line 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES. The performance comparison shows 
that our proposed scheme is efficient and required less buffer to perform security verification than the baseline 
AES protocols.  
 
Figure 10. Performance comparison of minimum buffer size required to process the security verification with various data rates to DSM. 
From the above experiments, we conclude that our proposed DPBSV scheme is secured (from authenticity, 
confidentiality and integrity attacks), and efficient (compare to standard symmetric algorithms such as 128-bit 
AES and 256-bit AES).  The proposed scheme also needs less buffer than the baseline methods to perform security 
verification.   
 
7 Conclusions and Future Works 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel authenticated key exchange scheme, namely Dynamic Prime-Number 
Based Security Verification (DPBSV), which aims to provide efficient and fast (on-the-fly) security verification 
scheme for big data streams. Our scheme has been designed based on symmetric key cryptography and random 
prime number generation. By theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations, we showed that our DPBSV 
scheme has provided significant improvement in processing time, required less buffer for processing and prevented 
malicious attacks on authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. In our scheme, we decrease the communication and 
computation overhead by dynamic key initialization at both sensor and DSM end, which in effect eliminates the 
need for rekeying and decreases the communication overhead. DSM implement before stream data processing as 
shown in our main architecture diagram. Several applications (e.g. emergency management and event detection 
etc.) need to discard unwanted data and get original data for stream data analysis. Proposed security verification 
scheme (i.e. DPBSV) perform in near real time to synchronize with the performance of stream processing engine. 
Our aim is not to degrade the performance of stream processing such as Hadoop, S4, and Spark etc by verifying 
security on-the-fly. We plan to pursue a number of research avenues in future. The foremost is to perform a 
comparative study of our work with other symmetric key cryptographic techniques such as RC4, RC6. We will 
further investigate new strategies to improve the efficiency of symmetric-key encryption towards more efficient 
security-aware big data streams. We are also planning to investigate using the technique to develop a moving target 
defense strategy for the Internet of Things. 
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